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Abstract
Decades of research has found that democratic dyads rarely exhibit violent tendencies,
making the democratic peace arguably the principal finding of Peace Science. However,
the democratic peace rests upon a dyadic understanding of conflict. Conflict rarely re-
flects a purely dyadic phenomena—even if a conflict is not multi-party, multiple states
may be engaged in distinct disputes with the same enemy. We postulate a network
theory of conflict that treats the democratic peace as a function of the competing in-
terests of mixed-regime dyads and the strategic inefficiencies of fighting with enemies’
enemies. Specifically, we find that a state’s decision to engage in conflict with a target
state is conditioned by the other states in which the target state is in conflict. When
accounting for this network effect, we are unable to find support for the democratic
peace. This suggests that the major finding of three decades worth of conflict research
is spurious.
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1 Introduction
Given its societal costs, few phenomena warrant more attention than interstate conflict. The
causes of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) have been considered for decades, and their
study is central to Peace Science. From this tradition has emerged the democratic peace,
the hallmark finding holding that democracies do not fight one another. Since the early
1990s, this literature has steadily grown into a major body of work, consisting of hundreds
of peer-reviewed articles. The consistent robustness of the democratic peace has lead many
to refer to it as a law of international politics (Hegre, 2014).
In most cases, scholars of the democratic peace consider dyadic conflicts. This focus on
bilateral conflict poses a theoretical problem, excluding the complex dependencies at work
outside the focal dyad that influences conflict behavior. The dyadic approach carries with it
a methodological problem in that regression methods treat dyadic conflicts as independent
conditional on the covariates (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2016). This is puzzling as conflict
is an intrinsically relational behavior that often includes more than two parties, even if
those parties are not bilaterally connected. For illustration, consider that US action in
Syria is constrained both by America’s relations with it’s allies—particularly Turkey—and
geopolitical opponents—particularly Russia.
We probe which interdependencies govern the decision of states to engage in militarized
conflict and suggest that the democratic peace is an artifact of studying conflict from a
dyadic perspective. We argue that the direct or indirect coordination of states with similar
regime types against common enemies accounts for the seemingly robust finding that jointly
democratic (and occasionally jointly autocratic) dyads, are less dispute-prone. To test our
theory, we utilize inferential network analysis to uncover the meso-level dynamics that in-
form state behavior. We find robust support for our proposition: once we account for the
common enemies of jointly democratic or jointly autocratic pairs, statistical support for the
democratic (and autocratic) peace vanishes. Moreover, after controlling for common bilat-
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eral predictors of conflict and the meso-level network measures we introduce here, jointly
democratic dyads appear to be more conflict-prone that mixed-regime dyads.
2 The Democratic Peace
The democratic peace is one of the foundational findings in IR, acquiring a law-like status
for some (Hegre, 2014). This finding has been surprisingly robust, and can be reduced as
follows: jointly democratic states do not go to war, but democratic states are not monadically
less likely to engage in conflict. Traditionally, scholars have attempted to make sense of this
finding through structural or normative explanations (Maoz and Russett, 1993). Alternative
explanations rely less upon regime type and more upon many related factors, including
trade networks (Dorussen and Ward, 2010), economic openness (Gartzke, 2007), lootability
(Rosecrance, 1986), IGOs (Pevehouse and Russett, 2006; Dorussen and Ward, 2008), and
identity (Gartzke and Weisiger, 2013).
A fitting review of every explanation for the democratic peace is beyond the scope of a
single book, much less an article. As such, we will confine our discussion to the two most
prominent explanations, the institutional and normative accounts, as well as the most perti-
nent explanation to our discussion—the network explanation. While many have challenged
the democratic peace using conventional large-N regression analyses, a number of recent
papers have used the tools of inferential network analysis to challenge its statistical validity
(Ward, Siverson and Cao, 2007; Dorussen and Ward, 2008; Maoz, 2009, 2010)—even drawing
upon network theory to question its fundamental premise (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011).
Given the complex interdependencies established to exist in the conflict network, a fully de-
veloped network theory tested using appropriate inferential network analysis methods seems
overdue.
3
2.1 Institutional Explanations
The initial explanation for the democratic peace holds that the structural and institutional
constraints placed on democratic policymakers lead to peaceful behavior when interacting
with other democracies. Introduced by Rummel (1983), this theory rests upon two assump-
tions (Maoz and Russett, 1993). First, in order to retain the benefits of holding office,
leaders must mobilize selectorate support for their policies. Second, mobilization of this
necessary political support can only be shortcut in times of emergency. Given these propo-
sitions, democratic leaders are reluctant to wage war given the cost, and should they decide
to go to war, preparation requires more time. As a result, by the time two democracies are
mobilized for war, diplomats would have had the opportunity to resolve disputes peacefully
(Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1994).Alternatively, when democracies experience crises
with autocrats, who lack democratic constraints on mobilization and escalation, they must
act quickly – they are put in no-choice situations (Rummel, 1983; Maoz and Russett, 1993;
Russett, 1994).
Another form of the institutional explanation emphasizes audience costs. In democracies,
leaders incur costs for backing down or reverting from stated positions. These costs may
make it easier for democracies to credibly signal commitments and resolve disputes (Fearon,
1994; Levy et al., 2015). In other words, democracies have the ability to signal resolve, and
in jointly democratic dyads, they are capable of more easily resolving disputes as both sides
are capable of credibly committing to a negotiated settlement (Hegre, 2014). It is worth
noting, however, that the audience cost literature is not without its critiques, with many
saying that there is little empirical support for audience costs (Snyder and Borghard, 2011;
Downes and Sechser, 2012), and that their logic should extend to single-party autocratic
regimes were it true (Weeks, 2008).
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2.2 Normative Explanations
Another classic and widely valued explanation of the democratic peace holds that democ-
racies act in accordance with certain norms that lead to peace when interacting with other
democracies. This explanation, developed by Doyle (1986), typically makes two assump-
tions (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1994). First, states (democratic or autocratic), to
the extent possible, externalize norms of behavior that are developed internally and charac-
terize their domestic political processes and institutions. Second, the international system
lacks a centralized authority determining norms, and when democratic and non-democratic
norms clash in dyadic relations, non-democratic norms will be dominant. This leads to
an important theoretical proposition, best described by Ember, Ember and Russett (1992):
‘The culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution
of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national
boundaries towards other democratic countries as well,” (576). Many dispute the normative
approach to understanding the democratic peace by arguing that its theories should pre-
dict a monadic democratic peace that does not exist (Raknerud and Hegre, 1997), and that
democracies often break liberal norms (Rosato, 2003).
2.3 Network Explanations
Scholars have recently considered the democratic peace through a networks-based framework,
emphasizing the explanatory power of trade (Maoz et al., 2006; Dorussen and Ward, 2010;
Lupu and Traag, 2012), IGOs networks (Maoz et al., 2006; Dorussen and Ward, 2008),
threat-based ego-networks (Maoz, 2010) and interdependence broadly (Maoz, 2009, 2010).
To date, few have attempted to understand the democratic peace using the topology—the
structure of network connections—of the conflict network (Maoz et al., 2007; Cranmer and
Desmarais, 2011).
The trade network has been used to explain the democratic peace. Maoz et al. (2006)
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found that similarity in states’ structural positions in the trade network dampens the prob-
ability of dyadic conflict. Dorussen and Ward (2010) and Lupu and Traag (2012) both find
evidence for the direct and higher-order pacifying effects of trade. Similar to their findings on
trade, Maoz et al. (2006) find pacifying effects for structural similarity in the IGO network.
Dorussen and Ward (2008) finds that indirect links between states though IGO networks
decrease the probability of conflict, particularly when diplomatic ties are weak.
Maoz posits that network explanations may resolve the democratic peace paradox wherein
the democratic peace holds at the dyadic level, but not at the monadic or systemic levels.
Maoz (2010) argues that as the number of democracies within a state’s threat-based ego-
network increases, a democracy is able to behave according to democratic norms and not
revert to the realist norms of autocracies. One problem with this approach is that it seems
much more likely that states would adopt particular norms, democratic and liberal or au-
tocratic and realist, according to the particular state they are interacting with than the
composition of the broader ego-network.
To our knowledge there has been only one, albeit brief, attempt to derive a purely net-
work topology-based explanation for the democratic peace. Cranmer and Desmarais (2011)
argue that two features of the conflict network may explain the democratic peace (81). First,
a state’s “popularity” in the conflict network, or the degree of targeting they experience,
may explain certain dynamics that dyadic covariates may not capture. In particular, this
popularity term or “two-star” term capturing the number of times two states i and k are
engaged in a dispute with the third j, would capture organized and internationally coordi-
nated responses to diplomatic and security crises. Second, Cranmer and Desmarais (2011)
specify a “triangle” network statistic, which they argue should reflect the tendency for the
conflict network to not form closed triangles of conflict. In this particular case, it would
make very little sense for i and k to go to war as it would undermine their mutual effort
against j – we would expect the enemy of a state’s enemy to be its friend, or at least not its
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enemy.1
The approach builds upon the findings of Gowa (1995) and Farber and Gowa (1997)
while offering a unique, fresh, and more empirically rigorous take. Farber and Gowa argue
that rates of war between democracies are lower than autocratic or mixed dyads due to the
Cold War, which lead to a pattern of alliances and interests that emerged as a response to
systemic dynamics. We attempt to build upon these works, devising a more fully developed
network theory of the democratic peace, while providing more rigorous analyses to shed light
on how precisely network based dynamics influence the democratic peace.
3 Network Structure and Conflict
Our network theory positions a state’s decision to go to war within the broader network-level
dynamics that condition state behavior. This theory essentially holds that the democratic
peace is a function of how states are aligned within a network, and how that alignment
produces peace between democracies. This peace is not a direct function of regime type, but
the inefficiencies of fighting enemies’ enemies. In studying the effect of network topology on
conflict two processes must be studied: (1) by what processes do states make the decision
to engage in a MID, and (2) how do network-level dynamics condition these state decision-
making processes?
.
3.1 State decision-making and conflict
It is generally thought that conflict emerges from disputes between states that have diverging
interests and are incapable of agreeing to a peaceful settlement (Fearon, 1995). These
1In related work, Ward, Siverson and Cao (2007) attempt to condition out the effect of network in-
terdependencies, such as sender or receiver effects or triadic closure, but do not attempt to introduce a
theoretically-motivated network explanation for the democratic peace.
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problems are often resolved through the use of third party mediators (Li et al., 2017) or
costly signals (Fearon, 1994). While this may be a gross simplification of the literature, we
find it a useful assumption. The emergence of conflicting preferences, the nature of these
disputes, and their likelihood to escalate are all informed by the regime type of the states in
question (Gartzke, 1998, 2000; Werner, 2000; Bennett, 2006).
If the opportunity for experiencing low-level disputes is a function of state preferences,
the political institutions of states surely matter. The relationship between mixed-regime
dyads and MIDs is well documented (Gartzke, 1998, 2000; Werner, 2000; Bennett, 2006);
as institutions and regimes become dissimilar, there is an increase in the opportunity for
disagreement about foreign or domestic policy preferences (Gartzke, 1998; Werner, 2000).
These disputes more more intractable as they may often emerge from differences in pref-
erences that are integral to the state, the identity of its citizens, or its leadership (Doyle,
1983). Consider, for example, the opportunity for disagreement between a democracy and an
autocracy regarding human rights—Cuba and the United States certainly have experienced
a myriad of disputes motivated largely by the dissimilarity of their political regimes and
human rights abuses under Castro. This dispute seems to be as intractable as a dispute can
get – for the United States to achieve its goal and then subsequently remove its sanctions
on Cuba, Castro had to have stepped down and accepted liberal institutions.
These intractable disputes often constitute enduring rivalries that occasionally flare into
violent conflict. Escalation is a function of many sub-processes, including a fear of dissimilar
regimes and exogenous political shocks. Weart (1994) notes that autocratic states, which
may be fearful of liberal intervention, retaliate against threats by initiating a dispute to si-
multaneously resolve the external threat and resolve internal discontent. Enduring rivalries,
particularly between democracies and autocracies, may be more likely to escalate as a func-
tion of exogenous shocks, including changes in relative capabilities (Geller, 1993), economic
productivity (Bennett and Nordstrom, 2000), or leadership (Bennett, 1997). To keep with
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the previous example, following the start of his administration in January 1981, President
Reagan adopted a hard-line policy towards Cuba. In July the Reagan Administration, in
an initial display of resolve, conducted air exercises. This prompted Castro to organize a
large militia force out of fear of potential U.S. military action.The preceding leads to the
following hypothesis:
H1 Mixed dyads are more likely to engage in military conflict.
Jointly democratic or autocratic dyads are not too distinct in this regard; certainly states
can have intractable disputes regardless of regime type. Jointly autocratic conflict is well
documented, and support for the autocratic peace (Raknerud and Hegre, 1997; Bennett,
2006) has recently been questioned (Gelpi and Grieco, 2008; Dafoe, Oneal and Russett,
2013). While MIDs between democracies are certainly less common, there are a non-trivial
amount of them. How, then, can one square the plethora of disputes between mixed dyads
with the relative sparsity of disputes between autocratic and democratic dyads? We believe
that the answer lies in structural features of the conflict network: that states with common
enemies should not themselves be enemies. More specifically, the conflicts between mixed
dyads often prompt formal or informal coordination between states of a common regime
type, and because of that, jointly autocratic states and jointly democratic states are less
likely to fight.
3.2 Network structure and conflict
The preceding logic cannot explain the democratic or autocratic peace independently. Any
two states, within reason, could find themselves having a conflict capable of escalation.
We propose that network dynamics explain why these mixed-regime dyadic conflicts are so
common relative to jointly autocratic or democratic conflict, which may in fact be artifacts
emerging form the inefficiencies associated with fighting enemies of enemies.
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(a) Two-star (b) Triangle
Figure 1: Generative features of the fatal MID network.
Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) established a generative model of the conflict network
using two network processes: k-stars and triangles. K-stars, in network parlance, refer to a
process where actor k is connected to actors i and j, but actors i and j are not connected
to each other. However, if k is of a different regime type than i and j, we refer to this
as a mixed two-star because actors included are of different types. In our case, a mixed
two-star reflects a situation in which two states, suppose both democracies or autocracies,
are engaged in a MID with a common enemy of the other type. This situation is illustrated
in Figure 1a. Triangles refer to the same process but actors i and j are also connected to one
another, forming a closed triangle like that illustrated Figure 1b. We use the term mixed
triangle to refer to the case where two of the states (i and j in the illustrative figure) are
of the same regime type and fighting one another. As noted by Cranmer and Desmarais
(2011), two-stars are fairly prevalent in the MID network while triangles are exceptionally
rare (though they were not considering mixed two-stars or triangles). We build upon their
finding and develop a theory regarding the tie-generating roles of mixed two-stars and mixed
triangles.2
The decision of a state to initiate or join a dispute with another of an opposite regime
2This approach stands in contrast to the theoretical approach of Maoz et al. (2007) examines different
forms of triadic balance in international phenomena. While finding that states with common enemies tend
to ally with one another, they fail to consider the important detail of the regime type of each state. By
accounting for regime type, as Maoz et al. (2007) acknowledge may be important, we can rigorously assess
the democratic peace and this counter-intuitive finding.
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type may be contingent upon the decisions of other actors of the same regime type. Consider
the decision of the United States to join the United Kingdom in the European theater of
World War II. The decision of the U.S. to fight Nazi Germany was conditioned by the U.K.’s
prior engagement against Nazi Germany. When alliances are present, the case is even more
compelling. The very nature of military alliances almost necessarily implies that dyadic
conflicts are interdependent. Because states of a similar regime type are more likely to share
interests and form alliances, they are also more likely to coordinate on MIDs, regardless of
whether the coordinating states are autocratic or democratic.
Consider the costs associated with conflict through a toy model—democracy i is consid-
ering fighting autocracy k to resolve an otherwise intractable dispute. If the cost of the war
is smaller than the expected gain of the war (the product of the gain associated with winning
the conflict and the probability of winning the conflict), then state i would be expected to
initiate the dispute. If the cost is larger, then state i may seek a partner j to share the
burden (direct coordination) or wait for state j to initiate an unrelated dispute with state k
that would divert state k’s resources (indirect coordination). For direct coordination, assum-
ing the gain of winning is fixed across the number of direct collaborators j, each additional
partner decreases the cost of the conflict and increases the probability of winning, increasing
the likelihood of the initial conflict or a state joining the conflict. For indirect coordination,
assuming the gain of winning is fixed across the number of indirect collaborators j, each
additional state j involved in an unrelated dispute with state k increases the probability of
states i and j winning by forcing state k to split their resources, increasing the likelihood
of the initial conflicts or any other state initiating a dispute. Having partners, even indirect
collaborators, can also increase the perceived international legitimacy of a military action.
This toy model is simplistic, but highlights how the decision to engage in a dispute can
be interdependent. This sort of process is common since international crises often receive
organized and internationally coordinated responses.
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Given that shared interests may be a necessary condition for states to coordinate a MID,
it would make sense that likely collaborators would be of a common regime type. Although,
this is not always necessary, interests can be heterogeneous and extend beyond those defined
by regime type. In World War II, the U.S.S.R. certainly collaborated with democracies: the
common interest between the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R to remove Hitler from power
lead to their coordination. It is documented that regime type influences the likelihood that
a state joins a conflict, with democracies being among those much more likely to join a
dispute as a collaborator (Corbetta and Dixon, 2005). Thus, we should expect that states
are more likely to join a conflict when their prospective partner is of similar regime type
(Gartzke, 1998, 2000; Werner, 2000; Corbetta and Dixon, 2005). Regardless of the severity
of the dispute, we expect states to seek out cost-sharing partners. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
H2 Mixed two-stars are a prevalent feature of the conflict network.
We propose that the democratic and autocratic peaces are a function of the inefficiencies
of fighting an enemy of an enemy. Consider the toy model discussed above. States i and j
have a new set of cost calculations they must make should they decide to fight each other–
not only would there be new costs imposed from a new conflict, but the probability of
winning the initial conflict decreases as both are mutually undermining the capacity of their
partner and splitting its attention and resources across multiple fronts. One implication
of this cost-sharing theory is that states i and j should be less willing to fight each other
when they are engaged in mutual conflict against a common enemy. Moreover, this sort
of mixed-triadic closure should be less common when conflicts are severe (e.g. involving
violence) than when the conflicts in question are lower-level political squabbles because the
costs are significantly higher. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3 Mixed triangles are unlikely in the conflict network.
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H4 The probability of mixed triadic closure should be higher in the network of lower-level
disputes than the network of serious military conflicts.
With our theory and hypotheses presented, we now turn to our empirical strategy.
4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical analysis draws on the model of the democratic peace used by Gartzke and
Weisiger (2013) and improved upon by Dafoe, Oneal and Russett (2013), then extends this
specification to include the network effects discussed above and an appropriate inferential
strategy for the conflict network.
4.1 The Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model
Breaking with much of the conventional conflict literature, which relies upon dyadic regres-
sion models to study MIDs, we utilize the temporal extension of the Exponential Random
Graph Model (TERGM) in order to conduct valid statistical inference in the presence of
network interdependencies. The strength of the TERGM lies in its ability to simultaneously
analyze the effect of monadic and dyadic variables in addition to network dependencies on
the initiation of military conflict (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011, 2016). The TERGM has
been used with high regard to produce sound and meaningful inferences in the study of a
variety of international phenomena, including sanctions (Cranmer, Heinrich and Desmarais,
2014), alliance dynamics (Cranmer, Desmarais and Menninga, 2012; Li et al., 2017), and
transnational terrorism (Desmarais and Cranmer, 2013).
The Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) and its temporal extension (TERGM)
provide an inferential means of estimating the probability of the observed network N condi-
tioned on a vector of specified statistics observed on the network h(N). The model is written
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as
P(N,θ) = exp{θ
′h(N)}∑
N∗∈N exp{θ ′h(N∗)}
(1)
where h(N) refers to the vector of statistics of interest (monadic and dyadic covariates as well
as endogenous network structures), θ refers to the coefficients associated with the prevalence
of these statistics, exp{θ ′h(N)} refers to a positive weight or the linear predictor, and the
denominator
∑
N∗∈N exp{θ ′h(N∗)} is a normalizing constant. The normalizing constant can
be thought of as the weights (or linear predictors) associated with all possible versions of a
network, N , with the same number of nodes as N . This normalizing constant is essential
as it allows the analyst to compute the probability of the network N as a function of the
covariates whilst scaling it by all the weight of all possible versions of the network such
that the quotient fulfills the probabilistic axiom that a probability is [0, 1] bound. This
normalizing constant can rarely be estimated directly as N , all possible permutations of the
network, quickly becomes computationally intractably large as the number of actors in the
network increases. As such, this is conventionally approximated using Monte Carlo methods
or, as we use here, bootstrapped maximum pseudolikelihood (MPLE) for temporal ERGMs
(Desmarais and Cranmer, 2010).3
The TERGM is the empirical model that most closely mirrors our theoretical model. It
allows us to assess longitudinal networks and test the observable implications of our network
theory while seamlessly incorporating the nodal, dyadic, and temporal covariates that many
have acknowledged in the literature as central to modeling conflict.4 For a more detailed
review of the ERGM and TERGM, we refer the reader to Cranmer and Desmarais (2011),
Cranmer et al. (2017) and Leifeld, Cranmer and Desmarais (2017).
3Some have raised concerns about the reliability of MPLE for ERGM confidence interval estimation
(Van Duijn, Gile and Handcock, 2009). However, recent work has indicated that the use of bootstrapped
MPLE for TERGM produces both unbiased coefficient estimates and consistent confidence intervals (Des-
marais and Cranmer, 2010).
4The purpose here is not to make the case of using network models in general, or to compare the TERGM
other network models. This has been done elsewhere (Cranmer et al., 2017). We use the TERGM here as
we believe it allows us to best assess our topology-based network theory.
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The results of an ERGM and TERGM can be interpreted at both the network level
and the micro-level, much in the same way as many conventional models (Desmarais and
Cranmer, 2012). The effect of a network statistic specified in h(N) shares the same substan-
tive sign and significance interpretation as generalized linear models—a positive parameter
indicates a positive relationship between the variable of interest and the odds of observing
that feature or tie based upon the change statistic associated with an edge. For example,
at the network level, a positive triangle parameter indicates that the likelihood of observing
triadic closure within a network is high relative to a random graph with the same number
of nodes. At the micro-level, however, a positive triangle parameter also indicates that a tie
between two actors increases as the two actors gain shared partners (i.e., friends of friends)
(Desmarais and Cranmer, 2012).
4.2 Data & Measures
Our primary outcome of interest is fatal militarized interstate disputes (FMIDs). Because
the use of deadly force requires, at a minimum, a relatively high level of commitment and risk
acceptance on the part of the initiating government, our theory is most likely to be manifest
among such serious conflicts. Our use of FMIDs is not as a correction to the heterogeneity in
MIDs as Hegre (2000) would recommend, but instead reflects a distinct theoretical process.5
In particular, we are interested in cases where there are significant costs to MIDs which are
typically manifested in the form of human casualties.
To compile our data, we begin from 687, 227 dyad-years reflecting all dyads in the state-
system between 1816 and 2001. These dyad-years were then translated into 186 undirected
binary network-years; a state is included in the network if they were a member of the state
system during that year. From this we form two networks, one of states tied through dyadic
5Gibler and Little (2017) note that the use of FMIDs may underestimate the pacifying effect of joint
democracy. However, the logic of the democratic peace should travel most cleanly to fatal MIDs. In a
baseline model specification presented later, joint democracy has a robust effect.
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Figure 2: Networks of All MIDs and FMIDs in an example System Year. Democratic states are
represented in blue, autocratic states are represented in red.
engagement in a MID of severity four or greater (FMIDs) and one of states tied through
dyadic engagement in a MID regardless of severity (MIDs). We choose to examine all
MIDs/FMIDs and not just originators as it is a more direct test of the cost-sharing portion
of the theory. Figure 2 presents the network of MIDs and FMIDs for 1938. As is made
clear, there is considerable evidence of a “pile-on” effect, where many states are engaged
in collaborative efforts against common enemies, often of a different regime type. Naively,
there also does not appear to be significant evidence of triadic closure.
4.2.1 Network Dependencies
Given our network theory of conflict, the democratic (or autocratic) peace may be under-
stood as a function of higher-order (indirect) network effects. In particular, we expect the
prevalence of dyadic conflict to be a function of interests and cost-sharing between states
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with common interests which then goes on to deter states from initiating conflict with col-
laborators. As previously discussed, this dynamic may be jointly considered as a function
of two network dependencies: mixed two-stars and mixed triangles.
The mixed two-star is an extension of the conventional two-star to include nodal at-
tributes in the calculation of the statistic. The mixed two-star is calculated as
hMTS(N) =
N∑
i>j>k
(NijDiAj)(NjkAjDk), (2)
where the value of hMTS(N) is a function of the sum of all instances where a democratic
state i is tied to autocratic state j (Nij) which is then tied to democratic state k (Njk). Di
and Dk refer to indicators for whether state i and k are democratic, and Aj refers to whether
state j is autocratic. This configuration refers to a coordinated MID where two democracies
are “teaming up” on an autocracy.6 We also account for the complement of this dynamic
with autocracies i and k and democracy j.
The mixed triangle is an extension of the conventional triangle statistic widely used in
the study of networks. In particular, it accounts for the presence of actors of different types.
It is calculated similar to the mixed two-star to account for the possibility of triadic closure
within a mixed two-star in the mixed triangle:
hMT (N) =
N∑
i>j>k
Nik[(NijAiDj)(NjkDjAk))]. (3)
To be clear, this is expressed similarly to the mixed-two star with the addition of a term
accounting for a tie between two nodes of the same type i and k in the same network.
To assist with model fit and further appraise theoretical specification, we utilize two
other network measures. First, in each model introduced here we include an “isolates” term,
6The mixed two-star and mixed triangle statistics, currently unsupported in the R package ergm, had to
be developed using the ergm.userterms package (Hunter et al., 2008).
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which is used to measure a network tendency for certain states never to experience a MID in
a calendar-year—a striking empirical feature of the sparse conflict network. Second, for one
model specification we replace the mixed-triangle term with a more conventional measure
of triadic closure—Geometrically Weighted Edgewise Shared Partners (GWESP). GWESP
allows the user to down-weight the tendency of a network to experience triadic closure to
produce the best fitting model. We use this term as a simpler operationalization of our
theory, and robustness test, but it does not account for mixed regime types within those
triangles.
4.2.2 Dyadic Covariates
In addition to our network statistics, we include a number of dyadic covariates in our model.
While there is certainly not a “standard” model of conflict, we include many of the factors
conventionally thought to influence conflict (Gartzke and Weisiger, 2013; Dafoe, Oneal and
Russett, 2013). In our primary model, we include nine covariates. First, and perhaps most
centrally, we include a dyadic indicator for whether the lowest POLITY IV within a dyad
takes on a value greater than six (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Dafoe, Oneal and Russett, 2013).
Given that our theory is also a theory of the similar preferences that may emerge from jointly
autocratic regime, we include an indicator for whether the greatest POLITY IV value within
a dyad is greater than six (Dafoe, Oneal and Russett, 2013). We also conduct a robustness
check using weak-link regime score, or the lowest POLITY IV value for a dyad.
Contiguity is often included in models as conflict, as states that share a border are more
likely to have an opportunity and/or motivation to fight (Diehl, 1985; Stinnett et al., 2002).
This variable is ordinal and describes six increasing levels of proximity. We choose not to use
great-circle distance between national capitals due to large amounts of missing data during
our period of observation.
We include two measures of the relative power of states in a dyad, as do many studies of
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the democratic peace (Singer, 1988). We follow Dafoe, Oneal and Russett (2013) and define
this ratio as:
CRAB =
CINChigh
CINCA + CINCB
(4)
We also include just the numerator of this term, which (Dafoe, Oneal and Russett, 2013)
argue is a more fine-grained measure of the major power indicator used in many studies.
Beyond capabilities, it is also thought that allies are less likely to go to war for a variety
of reasons, including the relative costs to security in fighting allies and the increase in
information on relative capabilities (Bearce, Flanagan and Floros, 2006). As such, we include
a variable capturing the level of alliance commitment within a dyad coded in ascending level
of commitment (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004).
We include three functions of time to capture temporal dependence that may exist in
MIDs between dyads (Carter and Signorino, 2010), including the number of peace years,
peace years squared, and peace years cubed.
Finally, we include a measure to account for the opportunity for MIDs in a given year.
This scale term is defined as the natural log of the number of states that exist in a given
year. The logic, presented by Raknerud and Hegre (1997), is that as the number of states
in a system increase for a given year, there should also be a proportionate increase in the
systemic propensity for conflict.
5 Results
We find support for our theory in both the fatal MIDs and all MIDs networks: mixed
two-stars are both positive and statistically significant, mixed triangles are negative and
statistically significant, and once both of these network statistics are accounted for, support
for the democratic and autocratic peace drops out. The precise combination of these effects
demonstrates that our theory and its underlying logic help to explain the democratic peace.
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Figure 3: Raw Count of Network Features Per Year. The count of network features are presented
per year and colored by feature.
Beyond simple statistical significance, we find that these variables allow the analyst to
accurately forecast conflict.
The raw counts of each of our primary network dependencies of interest are presented in
Figure 3. As is made clear, jointly autocratic conflict and mixed two-stars are fairly common
features of the MID and fatal MIDs networks. As is expected, conflict between democracies
is fairly rare, as are mixed-triangles. In this section we attempt to jointly model each of these
dependencies to disentangle the confounding effect of mixed two-stars and mixed triangles
on the democratic peace and to test our network theory of conflict.
We begin by considering the results of our primary analysis. We first interpret our results
from the models presented in Tables 1 and 2. Once our results are presented, we discuss the
goodness of fit for these models by assessing how well the model is capable of predicting the
last eleven years of conflict. Then, we present an analysis designed to present the “smoking
gun” for our theory. We find that the dyads that contribute most to the democratic peace
are, in fact, cases of mixed-regime dyads engaging in militarized disputes.7
7In the SI Appendix we assess the temporal stability of these effects.
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5.1 TERGM Results
Based on our theory, at the dyadic level we expect that mixed dyads would be more likely
to engage in conflict. When considering broader systemic levels, we expect a positive effect
for mixed two-stars and a negative effect for mixed triangles. Tables 1 and 2 support these
expectations for the MID and fatal MID networks, respectively.8 In a baseline TERGM
omitting our core explanatory variables, Model 1, with all relevant variables save those
operationalizing our theory, we uncover a robust democratic and autocratic peace in both
the MID and fatal MID networks.
To test our theory, we specify three different models with varying network covariates.
Model 2 reflects a simplified operationalization of our theory using mixed two-stars and as
opposed to the mixed triangle, a conventional triangle statistic, Geometrically Weighted
Edgewise Shared Partners (GWESP).9 Our ideal specification is presented in Model 3 for
both tables, which includes the baseline specification of Model 1 with mixed two-stars and
mixed triangles. Model 4 builds upon Model 3 by adding weak-link regime score, the lowest
Polity regime score within a dyad.10 Across these specifications, we find evidence supporting
our theory and problematizing the democratic peace.
First, a positive coefficient for the “mixed two-star” terms for both networks implies
that mixed dyads are more likely to engage in conventional and fatal MIDs, demonstrating
support for H1. In addition, we find support for H2, that mixed two-stars are a prevalent
8Goodness of fit routines that compare observed statistics to networks simulated from the models indicate
well, although not perfect, fitting models. These diagnostics, in addition to other robustness checks, are
presented in the SI Appendix.
9For any model including GWESP we use a geometric downweight of α = 0.5 which is indicative of a
fairly moderate downweight placed on the prevalence of triangles in the network. This weight is used to
assist with model identifiability.
10In Model 4 this variable is added in addition to the dyadic indicators for two reasons. First, wby
including both sets of variables the weak-link regime score should be interpreted as contributing a measure
of what happens between the thresholds of the indicators. Second, the addition of the dyadic indicators
improves the fit of the model overall which increases the accuracy of the model parameters underlying the
data generating process. Replacing the joint democracy indicator with weak-link regime score yields the
same substantive interpretation.
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feature of both the MID and fatal MID networks. Regardless of the model presented in
Tables 1 or 2 we find that the mixed two-star term’s effect is both positive and statistically
reliable. This demonstrates that mixed-regime dyads are more likely to experience dyadic
MIDs or FMIDs than dyads that have a common regime-type. This may indicate that the
democratic peace is a function of mixed dyadic conflict and a conflict of preferences. Second,
and more importantly, the positive and robust effect for mixed two-stars demonstrates that
states of a common regime type are likely to explicitly or implicitly coordinate in disputes
against states of a different regime type. This supports our cost-sharing model of conflict
collaboration whereby states may look for conflict partners with common interests, and in
particular, the same regime type.
Additionally, we find support for H3 – that mixed triangles are unlikely in conflict net-
works. This is demonstrated with a negative and statistically significant effect for both the
GWESP effect in Model 2 and the mixed triangles term in Models 3 and 4 as presented
in Tables 1 and 2. These results support the theoretical claim that triadic closure within
conflict networks is costly, especially for states of the same regime type. This effect, working
in conjuncture with the positive effect for mixed-two stars, provides support for our theory
overall since our main predictions were positive effects for mixed two-stars and negative
effects for mixed-triangles.
Assessing support for H4, that aversion to mixed triangles should be a stronger generative
feature of the fatal MID network than the all MID network, is difficult as the fatal MID
network is simply a thresholded and nested version of the MID network. By definition,
mixed-triangles must be less prevalent in the fatal MID network than the MID network. To
work around this problem, we examine the probability of tie formation between democratic or
autocratic states i and j conditional on their shared conflict with an autocratic or democratic
state k. If the distribution of these probabilities is higher in the MID network than the
fatal MID network then it would indicate that the MID network has a greater tendency
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Edges 0.12 −0.74 −4.02 −4.00
[−0.89; 1.08] [−1.54; 0.07] [−5.65; −2.81] [−5.63; −2.83]
Contiguity 0.57 0.59 0.57 0.57
[0.53; 0.61] [0.55; 0.63] [0.52; 0.62] [0.52; 0.62]
Capability Ratio −0.07 −0.03 −0.19 −0.19
[−0.23; 0.07] [−0.19; 0.12] [−0.43; 0.02] [−0.42; 0.02]
CINC (High) 6.50 4.51 5.18 5.28
[5.86; 7.19] [3.92; 5.16] [4.29; 6.09] [4.44; 6.23]
Alliance 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05
[0.02; 0.11] [0.01; 0.09] [−0.02; 0.11] [−0.01; 0.11]
ln States in System −0.46 −0.50 −0.46 −0.45
[−0.63; −0.28] [−0.64; −0.34] [−0.65; −0.27] [−0.64; −0.27]
Peace Years −0.26 −0.25 −0.24 −0.24
[−0.30; −0.23] [−0.28; −0.22] [−0.28; −0.21] [−0.28; −0.21]
Peace Years Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00; 0.01] [0.00; 0.01] [0.00; 0.01] [0.00; 0.01]
Peace Years Cubed −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
[−0.00; −0.00] [−0.00; −0.00] [−0.00; −0.00] [−0.00; −0.00]
Isolates 1.49 1.34 1.41 1.40
[1.35; 1.62] [1.18; 1.50] [1.23; 1.57] [1.23; 1.54]
Joint Democracy −0.76 0.22 3.44 3.17
[−1.14; −0.40] [−0.17; 0.59] [2.81; 4.26] [2.53; 4.09]
Joint Autocracy −0.32 0.56 3.83 3.90
[−0.41; −0.22] [0.40; 0.73] [3.37; 4.56] [3.42; 4.75]
Weak-Link Regime Score 0.02
[0.00; 0.05]
Mix Two-Star 0.35 0.44 0.44
[0.32; 0.38] [0.36; 0.56] [0.36; 0.56]
GWESP (0.5) −0.06
[−0.13; −0.00]
Mix-Triangle −6.72 −6.74
[−9.18; −5.62] [−9.54; −5.71]
Num. obs. 614834 614834 614834 614907
Table 1: TERGM Results, All MIDs. Bracketed values indicate 95% confidence intervals, bolded coef-
ficients have confidence intervals that do not include 0 and are thus statistically reliable at the conventional
0.05 level.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Edges 0.65 −0.67 −4.07 −4.06
[−0.66; 1.85] [−1.71; 0.49] [−5.99; −2.53] [−6.02; −2.65]
Contiguity 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.58
[0.54; 0.62] [0.57; 0.65] [0.53; 0.63] [0.53; 0.63]
Capability Ratio −0.10 −0.05 −0.26 −0.26
[−0.29; 0.07] [−0.23; 0.14] [−0.55; −0.01] [−0.54; −0.01]
CINC (High) 6.12 4.33 5.03 5.15
[5.48; 6.87] [3.67; 5.02] [4.03; 6.01] [4.01; 6.21]
Alliance 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05
[−0.00; 0.11] [−0.02; 0.09] [−0.02; 0.11] [−0.01; 0.11]
ln States in System −0.55 −0.49 −0.53 −0.52
[−0.76; −0.32] [−0.69; −0.30] [−0.75; −0.29] [−0.72; −0.27]
Peace Years −0.28 −0.27 −0.28 −0.28
[−0.33; −0.25] [−0.31; −0.24] [−0.33; −0.24] [−0.33; −0.24]
Peace Years Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.00; 0.01] [0.00; 0.01] [0.00; 0.01] [0.00; 0.01]
Peace Years Cubed −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
[−0.00; −0.00] [−0.00; −0.00] [−0.00; −0.00] [−0.00; −0.00]
Isolates 1.58 1.41 1.51 1.50
[1.42; 1.74] [1.23; 1.59] [1.32; 1.67] [1.31; 1.68]
Joint Democracy −0.91 0.05 3.83 3.52
[−1.21; −0.63] [−0.25; 0.32] [3.23; 4.79] [2.82; 4.62]
Joint Autocracy −0.27 0.60 4.39 4.49
[−0.38; −0.17] [0.42; 0.77] [3.85; 5.22] [3.94; 5.47]
Weak-Link Regime Score 0.03
[0.00; 0.05]
Mix Two-Star 0.39 0.60 0.61
[0.35; 0.43] [0.49; 0.72] [0.49; 0.73]
GWESP (0.5) −0.11
[−0.21; −0.03]
Mix-Triangle −6.86 −6.88
[−8.69; −5.96] [−9.05; −5.93]
Num. obs. 614777 614777 614777 614902
Table 2: TERGM Results, Fatal MIDs. Bracketed values indicate 95% confidence intervals, bolded co-
efficients have confidence intervals that do not include 0 and are thus statistically reliable at the conventional
0.05 level.
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towards triadic closure, offering additional support for our theory. We disaggregate these
distributions by the number of potential mixed-triangles incident upon the edge. Our theory
would expect that the cost of mixed-triadic closure increases as the number of shared enemies
between states increases. Figure 4 presents the results from this analysis which confirm our
theoretical expectation. First, for each of the plots presented the probability of triadic closure
is higher in the MID network than the FMID network, indicating that the potential costs
of triadic closure are much higher as conflict intensity increases. Second, the probability of
tie formation decreases based upon the number of mixed-triangles incident upon an edge,
indicating that the costs of fighting a conflict partner increase as they have more common
enemies.
To more systematically describe these distributions and their relative locations we utilize
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. A low p-value would indicate that the distribution
of probabilities of triadic closure is higher in the MID network than the fatal MID network.
We perform this test for each distribution of mixed-triangles incident upon an edge. The
results of these tests are presented in the sub-figure titles for Figure 4. We reject the null
hypothesis for four of six tests indicating mixed support for H4. It appears that when more
than 4 mixed-triangles are incident upon the edge the probability of triadic closure in the
MID network is not significantly higher than that in the FMID network. When examining
the results of a test that pools across these six conditions, a Komogorov-Smirnov test returns
a p-value significant at any conventional threshold, indicating support for H4.
In addition, once accounting for both mixed two-stars and mixed triangles, the theoretical
process we believe to underlie the democratic peace, we find that while the 95% confidence
intervals for the joint democracy and autocracy terms do not include zero, the signs flip.
This is presented by Models 3 and 4 in Tables 1 or 2. This would indicate that once
accounting for common enemies and the inefficiencies of fighting enemies of enemies, purely
dyadic conflict between joint democracies or autocracies is actually fairly common. There
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Figure 4: Probabilities of Triadic Closure. Plots are stratified by the number of potential mixed-
triangled incident upon the edge, boxes are colored by the network. A pooled Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
returns a p-value less than 2.2−16.
are 177 fatal MIDs between democracies between 1816 and 2001. Since 1974 there have
been 12 disputes between the U.S. and Canada. As recently as 1991, there was a high profile
fatal dispute between the U.S. and Canada over the Northwest Passage. This is just one
instance among many that conflict scholars often overlook. This demonstrates that not only
may our theory explain the democratic finding that has been standard in the peace science
literature for decades, but that decades of peace science literature on the democratic peace
may actually have gotten the answer exactly wrong. This result may seem counterintuitive
to many, but when interpreting the effect in the context of the model, it may seem more
intuitive. The positive effect for the joint democracy and joint autocracy term indicates that
when democracies or autocracies do not have common enemies, are not contiguous or allies,
when the probability that any given country wins or the capabilities of the strongest state
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in a dyad are low, jointly democratic or autocratic dyads are more dispute prone relative to
mixed dyads.
5.2 Out-of-Sample Prediction
In any study of conflict, one exceptionally relevant question is how well the model fits out-
of-sample (Ward, Greenhill and Bakke, 2010; Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017). To evaluate
how well our model can forecast fatal MIDs, we partition the data into two datasets. First,
we estimate a baseline model and a full network model with the same specification for Model
3 in Table 2 on a “training” dataset that includes all years 1816-1990. Once training the
model we evaluate how well the model can predict the next 11 years, 1991-2001.11 Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) and Precision-Recall (PR) Curves indicate that the model
fits the test data quite well. The network model fits much better than the baseline model
without our network measures of interest for all test networks according to area under the
ROC Curve (ROC AUC). This indicates that our network terms assist in avoiding false
positives while providing information that allows for the detection of true positives. Relying
upon ROC for rare events data, such as these however, does not give a clear picture as it is
fairly easy to predict negatives, or cases of non-conflict, while avoiding false positives. As
such, PR is often used for classification in class imbalanced data as it penalizes for both
false positives (predicted conflict where there was no conflict) and false negatives (predicted
peace where there was conflict) (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017). When examining PR, the
network model outperforms the baseline model for 6 of 11 test networks. In other words,
the network model outperforms the baseline model on average when managing the trade-off
of avoiding false positives and false negatives.
11The training model results closely approximate those presented in Table 2.
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(a) ROC Area Under the Curve (b) PR Area Under the Curve
Figure 5: ROC and PR Area Under the Curve by Test Network. Network model is colored in blue
relative to the baseline model with an isolates term presented.
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5.3 Influential Dyads
To get a sense of which dyads are contributing the most to the democratic peace, and get
a more fine-grained read on our theory, we estimated 19,856 different models iteratively
excluding a unique dyad from the estimation procedure. To estimate this model we use
a logistic regression model of fatal MID initiators that included the following variables:
Contiguity, Distance (ln), Probability of Winning, Largest CINC Scores, Allies, States in
System, Peace Years, Time Functions, and Weak Link Regime Score. In this case, we
transition from the prior dichotomized measure which is useful in the network context to the
commonly used weak link regime score, which is the lowest regime score within a dyad. The
following dyads, once removed, lead to the largest increases (or, moving away from large
negative values) in the democratic peace coefficient:
1. U.S. & North Korea (Mixed Dyad, 54 Years)
2. U.S. & Canada (Joint Democracy, 82 Years)
3. Iran & Iraq (Joint Autocracy, 70 Years)
4. U.S. & China (Mixed Dyad, 142 Years)
5. North Korea & South Korea (Joint Autocracy, 38 Years; Mixed Dyad, 15 Years)
6. U.S. & Iraq (Mixed Dyad, 70 Year)
7. Egypt & Saudi Arabia (Joint Autocracy, 65 Years)
8. U.K. & Iraq (Mixed Dyad, 70 Year)
9. Iraq & Kuwait (Joint Autocracy, 41 Years)
10. U.K. & France (Joint Democracy, 105 Years; Joint Autocracy, 58 Years; Mixed Dyad,
22 Years)
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Of the top ten, only a sliver of the dyads most influential for the democratic peace are
joint democracies. Of these ten only two dyads are consistently democratic, including the
U.S. & Canada and U.K. & France. Of the remaining cases four were typically mixed dyads
and four were typically jointly autocratic. We consider these cases the “smoking gun”—it
appears that the democratic peace may be influenced more by conflict between mixed dyads
and joint autocracies than by peace among democracies. The mixed dyads that exercise the
most influence over the democratic peace are enduring rivalries. Of the jointly autocratic
dyads, there are many cases where they directly fight one another regularly. Of the two
jointly democratic cases, there are few cases where crises of interests emerge. but many
cases of collaboration against a common autocratic enemy. Consider the Anglo-French dyad
following the Entente Cordiale in 1904. While there were common interests that may have
prevented conflict independently, the dyad coordinated to counter many external threats,
including the Triple Alliance and Axis Powers. While the United States and Canada certainly
had disputes in the 19th century, peace was maintained in the 20th century due to common
interest and coordination in MIDs against common enemies including Kim Il-Sung, Slobodan
Milosˇovic´, and Saddam Hussein. During World War 1, World War 2, Kosovo and the Gulf
War, it would make little sense for France and Britain or the U.S. and Canada to engage in
a MID.
6 Conclusion
The dyadic understanding of the democratic peace has become ubiquitous in International
Relations. By looking beyond simple dyadic analysis, accounting for the embededness of
states in a much more complex network, we found the democratic peace may not be as robust
as previously thought. Our results demonstrate that after accounting for the tendency for
like-regime states with common enemies not to fight one another, the effect of the democratic
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peace not only vanishes, but jointly democratic dyads seem to be more conflict prone than
mixed dyads. These results are consistent across operationalizations of the outcome variable,
our triadic closure predictor, measurements of joint democracy, and a variety of other factors.
We believe this explanation for the democratic peace is not a mechanism for understand-
ing the democratic peace, but instead, an alternative. What we have shown here is that
conflict between democracies indeed exists and the peaceful relations occasionally found are
not necessarily a function of the affinity of democratic states, or intrinsic attributes of demo-
cratic states, but instead, a function of the strategic inefficiencies of fighting a state with a
shared enemy. While regime type may influence the interests of states, we find that it does
not directly influence the probability that any two states fight one another.
There are three major implications to our research. First, scholars should be hesitant to
consider dyadic conflict in isolation, as there are network dependencies informing whether a
state engages or joins a MID. Second, preferences operating in addition to network interde-
pendencies and collaboration explain much of the democratic peace. Third, when studying
conflict, scholars and practitioners should consider the cost structure of collaboration, and
how these dynamics inform not only conflict initiation, but conflict escalation.
Particularly interesting is that the theoretical mechanism at work here is dramatically
simpler than any of the established justifications for the democratic peace. We do not rely
on arguments about institutions or norms, but just the simple and intuitive proposition that
it does not make much sense for two states fighting a third to also fight each other. What the
existing literature seems to have missed, usually theoretically and almost always empirically,
is that dyadic conflicts do not occur in isolation, but in the context of a complex network of
relations.
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